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Negotiation, Ratification, and Rescission of the




The law of contracts has developed over the centuries as a living
testament to the fact that on frequent occasions human beings are
liars. In social relations, in business transactions, and even in the
administration of criminal justice, promises are made and promises
are broken. Remedies for broken promises vary throughout our body
of laws. The divorce laws of most states countenance broken prom-
ises in social relations without much regard for resulting injury to
the family unit.' Since passage of the Statute of Frauds in 1677,2
relief is more likely to be granted against the person whose falsehood
has been memorialized in writing than against another whose un-
truthfulness has been verbal. This dichotomy was perpetuated in
America's Uniform Commercial Code.3 A conflicting array of laws
dealing with dishonesty confronted the Supreme Court of the
United States when it decided Santobello v. New York' a case which
considered whether a guilty plea agreement negotiated between de-
fendant and prosecutor may achieve juristic effect.
* J.D., Ph.D. Professor, University of Pittsburgh. Member of the Bars of Massachusetts,
New York, and the District of Columbia.
1. This is evidenced by the fact that "no fault" divorces have become the rule rather than
the exception in most states; a child is rarely heard and even more rarely represented by a
lawyer during his parents divorce and custody proceedings; and in property settlements child
"support" payments are limited as a rule to just that-payment for necessaries only. Nor does
the child fare better in "community" property jurisdictions, since apparently the child is not
recognized as being a member of the marital community.
2. 29 Car. 2, c.3 (1677).
3. See U.C.C. § 2-201 providing that a contract for the sale of goods for the price of $500
or more is not enforceable by way of action or defense unless there is some writing sufficient
to indicate that a contract for sale has been made between the parties and signed by the party
against whom enforcement is sought or by his authorized agent or broker. See also exceptions
under §§ 2-201, 2-206, and 8-318 of the Code; and Note, The Doctrine of Part Performance
Under UCC Sections 2-201 and 8-319, 9 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 355 (1968). See also Note,
The Doctrine of Equitable Estoppel and the Statute of Frauds, 66 MmH. L. REv. 170 (1967).
4. 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
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Writing the opinion of the Court in Santobello, Chief Justice
Burger noted in dictum: "The disposition of criminal charges by
agreement between the prosecutor and the accused, sometimes
loosely called 'plea bargaining,' is an essential component of the
administration of justice."5 Indeed, during most of this century
criminal charges filed against most defendants' in nearly every state
and federal judicial unit7 have been disposed of without trial as part
of a "gentlemen's agreement" to which defendants have appeared
to consent.' Most commonly, when a defendant pleads guilty to one
5. Id. at 261.
6. Most charges filed against most defendants are disposed of by means of the guilty plea.
See The Plea Bargain in Historical Perspective, 23 BUFF. L. REv. 499, 512-24 (1974). A study
of 28 reporting states and the District of Columbia for the year 1937 revealed that in 11 of
these jurisdictions convictions were obtained without trial in 90% or more of the cases; that
in 25 of these jurisdictions convictions were obtained without trial in 80% or more of the cases;
and that in only 4 jurisdictions (Indiana, Michigan, Pennsylvania and Utah) were convictions
obtained by means of trial in more than 20% of the criminal cases reaching disposition. See
JONES, CRIME WIour PUNISHMENT 70 (table 5-1) (1979) citing U.S. BUREAU OP THE CENSUS,
JUD. CRIM. STATS., 1937, 9-64 (table 2 for each State) (1939). A similar pattern remained true
for these and other states during the mid- 1970's. Of 21 states and the District of Columbia
for which comparable data was available, convictions were obtained without trial in 90% or
more of the cases processed in 8 jurisdictions; convictions were obtained without trial in 80%
or more of the cases processed in 17 jurisdictions; and in only 5 jurisdictions (Delaware,
Kansas, Louisiana, Pennsylvania and Wyoming) were convictions obtained by means of trial
in more than 20% of the criminal cases reaching disposition. See JONES, CRIME WITHOUT
PUNISHMENT 44 (table 4-1) (1979) citing selected annual reports from various state courts.
7. Most charges filed against most defendants in the United States District Courts have
reached disposition by means of the guilty plea continuously since 1918. During the years
between 1908 and 1975 (excluding particularly several years during World War U for which
comparable data is unavailable), convictions were obtained without trial in federal courts in
80% or more of all cases during 21 years (including all years between 1945 and 1960). See
JONES, CRIME WITHOUT PUNISHMENT 74 (table 5-4) (1979) citing various reports from the
United States Government.
8. Most guilty pleas are the products of bargaining between prosecutors and defense
counsel. When asked what percentage of guilty pleas are bargained, 42.6% of public defenders
in 43 states said that more than half were. See Guilty Plea Bargaining: Compromises by
Prosecutors to Secure Guilty Pleas, 112 U. PA. L. REy. 865, 902 (1964). Other studies have
estimated that between 75%-99% of all guilty pleas are bargained. See, e.g., The Role of Plea
Negotiation in Modern Criminal Law, 46 Cm-KENT L. REv. 116 (1969), NEwMAN, CONVICTION:
THE DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE WITHOUT TRIAL (1966); Profile of a Guilty Plea:
A Proposed Trial Court Procedure for Accepting Guilty Pleas, 17 WAYNE L. REV. 1195, 1196
(1971).
9. Consent by defendants to guilty pleas appears, primarily, to be predicated upon their
desire to speed-up the judicial process and to avoid trial as well as to obtain charge and/or
sentence concessions as consideration for waiving the right to trial. See, e.g., Shelton v.
United States, 242 F.2d 101, 115 (5th Cir. 1957) (dissenting opinion of Tuttle, J.); Lambros,
Plea Bargaining and the Sentencing Process, 53 F.R.D. 509 (1972); White, A Proposal for
Reform of the Plea Bargaining Process, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 439, 443 (1971). "Whether the
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or two criminal charges, all or most other charges pending against
him at the same time are dismissed.'
The Santobello decision settled the issue of whether a guilty plea
agreement negotiated between a defendant and a prosecutor may
achieve juristic effect. In holding that the prosecutor has a legal
obligation to fulfill any promise on which the defendant has relied
to his detriment by pleading guilty, the Supreme Court may have
applied the doctrine of promissory estoppel to guilty plea agree-
ments predicated upon negotiated conditions." Since the Supreme
Court reasoned that a material breach of the conditions underlying
a negotiated guilty plea entitles the defendant to have either spe-
cific performance or rescission, 2 the Court seems to view negotiated
guilty plea agreements as more than simple bargains-they become
formal contracts.
Five years have elapsed since the Santobello decision was an-
nounced. Subsequent court decisions 3 have been reached in light of
Santobello, and legislatures in some states have demonstrated an
expanded concern for the need both to formalize and to standardize
the process of negotiation leading to the tender of guilty pleas by
defendant surrenders his right to a trial because of a bargain with court or prosecutor, or
exercise his right at the cost of a stiffer sentence, a price has been put on the right." Scott v.
United States, 419 F.2d 264, 271 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (Bazelon, J.).
10. See Dash, Cracks in the Foundation of Criminal Justice, 46 ILL. L. REv. 385, 393
(1951); Kuh, Plea Copping, 24 N.Y. Co. B. BuLL. 160, 163-64 (1966-67).
11. 404 U.S. at 262.
12. The majority of the Court remanded the case to the state trial court and left to the
discretion of the trial judge the choice between granting specific performance on the plea
(entitling the defendant only to be resentenced before a different judge) and rescission (enti-
tling the defendant to an opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea). Defendant sought the
second alternative as relief. Id. at 263. In a concurring opinion, Justice Douglas urged that a
state court "ought to accord a defendant's preference considerable, if not controlling, weight."
Id. at 267. In an opinion dissenting as to the relief only, Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan
and Stewart, argued that a defendant in the Santobello situation should be entitled to the
relief (rescission) requested. Id. In fact, upon remand the state court ordered specific perform-
ance for Santobello and denied him permission to withdraw the plea, although one justice
dissented on grounds that Santobello received too lenient treatment and should have stood
trial. People v. Santobello, 331 N.Y.S.2d 776 (1972).
13. See, e.g., United States v. Ewing, 480 F.2d 1141 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v.
Hallam, 472 F.2d 168 (9th Cir. 1973); State v. Kimes, 195 N.W.2d 216 (Neb. 1972); and State
v. Thomas, 294 A.2d 57 (N.J. 1972) (specific performance granted); Barker v. State, 259 So.
2d 200 (Fla. 1972); People v. Ramos, 102 Cal. Rptr. 502, 26 Cal. App.2d 108 (1972) (with-
drawal granted); People v. Selikoff, 41 A.D.2d 376 (1973), aff'd, 360 N.Y.S.2d 623, 35 N.Y.2d
227 (1974) (neither specific performance nor withdrawal permitted); People v. Fernandez, 359
N.Y.S.2d 314 (1974) (specific performance is withdrawal).
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criminal defendants." The most crucial question has not been an-
swered: what impact has Santobello, together with derivative law,
exerted upon the actual practice of negotiating guilty pleas?
The Georgetown Plea Bargaining Project addressed this issue and
others during the course of its nationwide data-gathering phase.,'
Unlike much prior research on plea bargaining, prosecutorial discre-
tion, and related subject-matter, 6 the Georgetown Project avoided
prolonged concentration on any single jurisdiction and proceeded to
Atudy available data pertaining to each of the 3,100 judicial units
in the fifty states.'" On-site field visits were conducted by members
of an interdisciplinary professional research staff in many jurisdic-
tions selected at random. 8 During the course of these visits, relevant
14. A number of these states have adopted, in part or in toto, FED. R. CRIM. P. 11. See
notes 26 & 34 infra.
15. In addition, this Project endeavored to determine whether improper or undesirable
plea bargaining practices, if any, could be corrected through better and more intensive judi-
cial oversight of the negotiation process; and to isolate and identify specific elements of
coercion and impropriety in the disposition of criminal cases through bargaining. The Pro-
ject's nationwide data-gathering phase began on 1 October, 1974 and has continued through-
out much of 1976.
16. See, e.g., Andrews, The Role of the Prosecutor in Utah, 5 UTAH L. REV. 70 (1956);
Berger, The Case against Plea Bargaining, 62 A.B.A.J. 621 (1976); Bishop, Guilty Pleas in
the Pacific West, 51 J. URa. L. 171 (1974), Guilty Pleas in Texas, 24 BAYLOR L. REV. 301
(1972); Guilty Pleas in Wisconsin, 58 MARQ. L. REv. 631 (1975); Comment, Guilty Pleas in
Illinois-The Enigma of Substantial Compliance, 24 DEP. L. REv. 42 (1974); Comment, Plea
Bargaining in Washington, 6 GONZ. L. REV. 269 (1971); Riseland, The Guilty Plea in South
Dakota, 15 S.D.L. REV. 66 (1970); Eisenstein & Jacob, Felony Justice (1977); Comment,
Judicial Supervision over California Plea Bargaining: Regulating the Trade, 59 CALIF. L. REV.
962 (1971); Klonoski, Plea Bargaining in Oregon-An Exploratory Study, 50 OR. L. REV. 114
(1971); Comment, Plea Agreements in Oklahoma, 22 OKLA. L. REV. 81 (1969); Plea With-
drawal in Oklahoma, 23 OKLA. L. REV. 472 (1970); POUND & FRANKFURTER, CRIMINAL JUSTICE
IN CLEVELAND (1922); Rosgrr & CRESSEY, JUSTICE By CONSENT (1976); ZEISEL, CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM UNDER STRESS (1975).
17. There are 3,100 separate state judicial units in the United States, including the Dis-
trict of Columbia Court of Appeals and Superior Courts. Of these units, 29 in Alaska are
divisions, 64 in Louisiana are parishes, and 41 (38 in Virginia plus one each in Maryland
(Baltimore), Missouri (Saint Louis), and Nevada (Carson City) are independent cities. The
balance are counties.
18. Sites for field visits were selected by means of a table of random numbers from a
sampling frame consisting of judicial units serving a population in excess of 100,000 based
on the 1970 census. A ten percent probability sample of these jurisdictions was obtained.
Since one objective of the Georgetown Plea Bargaining Project is to avoid political squabbles,
the names of specific jurisdictions visited, with a few exceptions, will not be mentioned in
this article. These jurisdictions, are located in the following states: Alabama, Arizona, Cali-
fornia, Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nevada, New Jer-
sey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Tennessee, Texas and Virginia. In addi-
tion, jurisdictions located in Alaska, Florida, Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland, Missouri, Oregon
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judicial and extra-judicial proceedings'9 were observed; and key ac-
tors in different areas of the criminal justice process were inter-
viewed.2 0 As a result of this effort, a complete and unique data base
was generated, so the impact of Santobello and related law can be
assessed empirically. The purpose of this article is to present such
an assessment, together with its implications and recommendations
for change.
II. THE GUILTY PLEA NEGOTIATION PROCESS
Most criminal defendants do not march into the courtroom and
plead guilty "on the nose" to the charges at their initial appearance.
In some states, a statute21 prescribes the amount of time that must
elapse between arrest and tender of a defendant's guilty plea. Dur-
ing this interim period, which is prolonged routinely for three to six
months in many jurisdictions and may approach or exceed a year
in some, defense counsel and assistant prosecutors converse periodi-
cally as normal negotiations get underway. As these negotiations
progress, a judge may be invited to participate 2 in the formulation
of sufficient consideration to support an agreement.
Ordinarily, an agreement arises out of an offer by one party and
and- Pennsylvania were selected purposefully for field visitation due to peculiar plea bargain-
ing characteristics suspected to exist in certain judicial units within those jurisdictions.
19. Judicial proceedings which were monitored included whenever possible: arraign-
ments, preliminary hearings, pretrial and/or plea conferences, pretrial motions, rearraign-
ments for offer, acceptance, tender and ratification of guilty pleas, presentence conferences
and hearings, and sentencing proceedings. In addition, extra-judicial (held in the absence of
a judge) proceedings which were monitored included whenever possible: early prosecutorial
screening, charging conferences, calendar calls, pretrial and/or plea conferences and present-
ence conferences.
20. In each jurisdiction that was visited, several judges (in most instances including the
administrative or assignment judge), the public defender and several of his subordinate staff
members, the prosecutor and several of his subordinate staff members, together with at least
one attorney in the private practice of criminal law were interviewed whenever possible. Court
administrative personnel and other relevant persons including defendants in some jurisdic-
tions were interviewed.
21. ALA. CODE § 263 (1975). These provisions cannot be waived by a defendant. Rep. Atty.
Gen. p. 332 (Oct-Dec. 1939). This fifteen day provision is mandatory and must be strictly
complied with. Patrick v. State, 43 Ala. App. 620, 197 So. 2d 782 (1967).
22. Some states prohibit judicial participation during any portion of the process leading
to a guilty agreement. See, e.g., Rule 25.3(a), ARK. R. CiM. P.; Rule 21(g)(1); N.M. R. CalM.
P.; N.C. CRIM. P. Act, § 15-A-1021(a); Rule 11(d)(1), N.D. R. CraM. P.; Rule 219(b)(1), PA.
R. CaiM. P.; Shavie v. State, 49 Wis. 2d 579, 182 N.W.2d 505 (1971). The rule in Illinois is
that a judge should not initiate plea discussions. Rule 402, ILL. S. CT. R.
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an acceptance by another, supported by sufficient consideration. A
guilty plea agreement is created in the same fashion, and it may
become a contract depending upon the nature and extent of any
legal obligations incurred by the parties. Sometimes a guilty plea
agreement may require the fulfillment of conditions; and these may
be expressed, implied in fact, or implied in law. As in any other
agreement, conditions may be concurrent (mutual conditions pre-
cedent), precedent, or subsequent; and each condition, if material
and unfulfilled, may cause the agreement to become breached. As
in any other agreement, also, the obligations of at least one party
to a guilty plea agreement may become discharged on account of the
inexcusable failure of a supporting consideration. The purpose of a
guilty plea agreement may become frustrated; likewise, the obliga-
tions created thereunder may become impossible to perform. Some
guilty plea agreements become dishonored which may precipitate a
request by at least one party to have specific performance or rescis-
sion. Because a guilty plea agreement consists of so many interfac-
ing elements, a complete contractual analysis is in order.
A. Offer and Acceptance
The term "offer" is used more ambiguously during the process of
guilty plea negotiations than during commercial transactions. An
observer of plea discussions-is likely to hear a prosecutor, a defense
counsel, or both "offer" to bargain, or to indicate under what cir-
cumstances the other side's "offer" to bargain might be acceptable.
At what point is a formal offer made? Quite clearly, these informal
proposals constitute mere preliminary inquiries, the objective of
which is to enable each side to ascertain the future intentions of the
other; to obtain from the other side a price quotation 3 indicating the
quality and quantity of consideration required to construct any fu-
ture agreement; and to clarify the protocol for developing the proce-
dural and substantive content of a future agreement. 4 Until these
23. In the context of the guilty plea negotiation, a price quotation would not involve
dollars but instead would consist of an estimate of the number of charges/counts to which
the defendant would be expected to plead guilty or nolo contendere, the seriousness of these
charges/counts, the minimum-maximum sentence which would be imposable, and the likeli-
hood of an alternative to commitment.
24. Counsel may discuss the need, if any, to reduce discussions to a formal or an informal
writing; the feasibility of disposing of pending charges rapidly or the feasibility of delay
Vol. 17: 3-4
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antecedent events have transpired, it is rare for either party to sug-
gest the terms of a formal guilty plea agreement.
Either the prosecutor or the defendant may propose the terms of
a guilty plea agreement, but defense counsel, if the defendant is
represented,2 negotiates for the defendant. Whichever side drafts
the agreement, the subject-matter may be either understood by the
parties verbally or reduced to writing. Although verbal understand-
ing is the most common, a few states require guilty plea agreements
to be written. 26
The distinction between offeror and offeree seems less significant
in relation to the guilty plea agreement than in the context of com-
mercial transactions. Here the distinction is inconsequential be-
cause of the interface of two factors: (1) the "promise" by a defen-
dant to plead guilty is without juristic effect unless, and until, the
defendant actually tenders the plea; and (2) in most jurisdictions a
guilty plea must be tendered by the defendant personally and in
open court.2 A defendant's out-of-court "promise," especially a ver-
bal one, to plead guilty to a criminal charge might be an executory
agreement or understanding; but it cannot reach the status of an
executory contract because it is not binding upon the defendant. In
the absence of a record to document the knowing and intelligent
waiver of his constitutional right to trial plus companion rights,28 a
(depending primarily upon whether the defendant is out on bail or in custody); the possibility
that a guilty plea, if tendered at all, might be tendered before a specific judge selected by
the defendant or at least by compromise among counsel; the avwilability, value, and wisdom
of a sentence recommendation by the prosecutor. In the ultimate analysis, the consideration
for and the conditions of a guilty plea agreement.will be explored.
25. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
26. At least three states require all guilty plea agreements to be reduced to writing. See
Rule 17.4(a), ARIz. R. CaiM. P.; Rule 21(g)(2), N.M. R. CraM. P.; and CRIMINAL RULE 4.2(G),
WASH. SUPER. CT. R. Elsewhere some defendants may be required to execute a written guilty
plea agreement. See W. VA. CODE, § 62-3-1a. Apparently in Minnesota a defendant charged
only with a misdemeanor may elect to have a guilty plea petition filed by a counsel as an
alternative to tendering the plea personally in open court. Rule 15.03(2), MINN. R. CRIM. P.
Contra, in Utah where all guilty pleas must be oral. UTAH CODE CRIM. P., § 77-24-2. In most
other states, the guilty plea itself (as opposed to the agreement, if any) must be tendered by
the defendant orally and personally in open court. See, e.g., Rule 24.3(a), ARK. R. CaM. P.;
CAL. PENAL CODE, § 1018; Rule 11(a), OHIO R. CRiM. P. In some states, however, the guilty
plea may be made in writing or orally, but the defendant still must be present in court, or so
it appears. See, e.g., CODE OF ALA., tit. 15, § 288(10).
27. Id.
28. For the importance of record adequacy, see McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459
(1969) and Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969). For the right to trial and companion
constitutional rights which a defendant waives by a guilty plea, see notes 57-61 infra.
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defendant has not assumed any legal obligation to go forward with
a contemplated guilty plea; indeed he may repudiate a "promise"
to do so at will and without penalty prior to actually tendering the
plea itself. The defendant's performance alone, in the form of his
tender of the plea, constitutes the minimum conduct 9 necessary to
transform a guilty plea agreement into a contract containing bind-
ing legal obligations. For this reason, the ordinary guilty plea agree-
ment becomes a unilateral contract if it becomes a contract at all.
Where statute requires guilty plea agreements to be executed in
writing 3 this written agreement should not be regarded as evidence
of the defendant's "promise" to plead guilty. The document may
serve as the defendant's actual guilty plea when properly executed,
acknowledged and delivered to the court for filing. In most states,
the defendant who has executed a written plea agreement must
appear in open court to tender a personal recognizance of the writ-
ten document.' In a few states, however, those individuals who are
charged with a misdemeanor only may elect to execute a written
petition to plead guilty or nolo contendere and cause this to be
submitted to the court by defense counsel as an alternative to ap-
pearing personally before the court.32 Since even under this proce-
dure the defendant's own counsel transmits the petition, presuma-
bly the petition may be withdrawn prior to counsel's delivery of the
instrument to the court. The mere fact that a guilty plea petition
exists in writing should not disguise its purpose, which is to facili-
tate the defendant's constructive performance by means of substi-
29. In addition, ratification by the court is required and in some states permission of the
prosecutor must be obtained at the time the plea is tendered. See, e.g., S.C. CODE § 17-23-
130.
30. See note 26 supra. Many judicial units within states which do not require guilty plea
agreements to be executed in writing are beginning to favor this practice. The first step
toward a written plea agreement may be implementation of a policy within the prosecutor's
(or public defender's) office requiring assistants to make notes in the case file concerning
negotiated dispositions. The next step may be for the prosecutor to have a simple form called
a "plea slip" constructed and printed. This primitive memorialization will not evidence the
terms of an agreement, but it will serve as a testament to the existence of an agreement, when
executed by the parties thereto. Usually only after several years of experimentation, jurisdic-
tions are beginning to utilize complete contract forms containing carbon or "magic carbon"
paper to facilitate multiple copies. Some of these local forms are very similar to the forms
which have been appended to the statutes in a few states. See, e.g., Forms XVIII and XIX,
ARIz. R. CRiM. P.; Appendices A and B to Rule 15, MINN. R. CriM. P.; and the "written
statement" form contained in Criminal Rule 4.2(g), WASH. SUPER. CT. R.





An interesting but unlikely question may evolve from use of a
written plea agreement or petition properly executed by a defendant
out-of-court but delivered to the prosecutor rather than to defense
counsel. If the instrument contained a record of the defendant's
voluntary waivers, together with a factual basis for the plea, 4 could
the prosecutor enforce the terms of the document notwithstanding
the defendant's subsequent repudiation? To invest a prosecutor
with such a privilege would seem to confer a warrant of attorney
empowering him in effect to confess judgment against the defen-
dant. In view of the many injustices associated with the confession
of civil judgment, confession of criminal judgment should be un-
conscionable on its face. In any event, it must be void unless the
confession is accomplished pursuant to a written instrument which
at the time the instrument was executed, contained a conspicuous
clause" warning the defendant of this possible outcome. Even so,
33. In this situation, the defense counsel or other person who actually delivers the petition
to the court and physically causes it to be filed acts as the agent of the defendant to construc-
tively perform the tender of the plea. As with a deed for the conveyance of real property, a
written plea petition should not be viewed as a promise to tender a plea but as a plea itself
which is not tendered until delivered to the court and filed as required by law.
34. In Federal courts the judge must address the defendant and inquire into the factual
basis for the plea. Rule 11(c), FED. R. CRiM. P. Accord, Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238
(1969). However, neither Boykin nor any other federal decision has required state court judges
to inquire into the factual basis for a guilty plea, and consequently many state judges do not
make such an inquiry. See The Trial Judge's Satisfaction as to the Factual Basis of Guilty
Pleas, 1966 WASH. U.L.Q. 306. A number of states have adopted Rule 11(c), FED. R. CRIM. P.
See, e.g., Rule 11, DEL. SUPER. CT. R.; Rule 11, D.C. SuPER. CT. CRiM. Div. R.; Rule 402(a),
ILL. S. CT. R.; Rule 11A, MAINE R. CiuM. P.; Rule 4, MAss. R. CRiM. P.; N.C. CRIM. P. AcT, §
15A-1022; Rule 21(e), N.M. R. CRiM. P.; Rule 1l(B), OHIO R. CRIM. P.; Rule 11, R.I. CRIM.
P. R.-SUPER. CT.; and State v. Sisco, 169 N.W.2d 542 (Iowa 1969). Other states appear to
have adopted Federal Rule 11(c) substantially. See, e.g., Rule 15.01, MINN. R. CRIM. P.; Rule
319(a), PA. R. CRIM. P.; Rule 3A:15, VA. CriM. P. R.; and Britain v. State, 497 P.2d 543 (Wyo.
1972). At least one state permits counsel to speak on this matter for his client. MONT. CODE
CriM. P., § 95-1606(b). On the contrary, some states do not require that any ritual be followed
by the judge during inquiry. See, e.g., James v. State, 242 Md. 424, 219 A.2d 17 (1966).
35. How should such a clause be drafted, assuming, arguendo, that it would be constitu-
tional operationally, which it might not be? Would the following be sufficient? (In bold face
type and red ink): WARNING: THIS AGREEMENT WILL BE IRREVOCABLE - DAYS
AFTER ITS EXECUTION, AND WILL BIND THE DEFENDANT TO EACH OF ITS
TERMS. IF THE DEFENDANT BECOMES UNWILLING OR UNABLE TO FULFILL
HIS PART OF THIS AGREEMENT BY PLEADING GUILTY TO THE STATED CHAR-
GES(S) AS AGREED, HE AUTHORIZES ANY DULY LICENSED AITTRNEY AT LAW
TO CONFESS CRIMINAL JUDGMENT ON HIS BEHALF BY PLEADING HIM GUILTY
UNDER THE TERMS OF THIS AGREEMENT IN ANY COURT OF COMPETENT JU-
RISDICTION.
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the prosecutor would not be enforcing a promise; he would become
the defendant's agent for the substitute tender of the plea by means
of constructive performance. Needless to say, a conflict of interest
would emerge to create an ethical dilemma."6
Since a guilty plea agreement must result in a unilateral contract
if and when it becomes a contract at all, the defendant's perform-
ance should be charted in relation to the prosecutor's correlate
promise. In a normal unilateral contract, the offeree's performance
is tendered in response to a previous communication of the offeror's
promises. This order is followed in the majority of guilty plea agree-
ments across the nation. Occasionally a defendant may tender a
guilty plea which is conditioned upon proposed conduct by the pros-
ecutor to which the latter has not consented previously. If at the
time of tender the prosecutor does agree (6r may be deemed to
agree) to become bound by conditions on which the guilty plea has
been tendered by a defendant, then such a sequence may create a
reverse unilateral contract.3 7 Note, however, that if the defendant
tenders an unconditional guilty plea in consideration of which no
promises by the prosecutor are expressed or implied, then no con-
tract exists between the defendant and the prosecutor.
One final point should be made concerning the discretion of the
judge before whom a guilty plea is tendered.38 Only on rare occasions
does the court become a principal party to a guilty plea agreement;3 1
therefore, the ordinary guilty plea agreement requires judicial ratifi-
cation rather than acceptance or rejection. Normally, the court
should be viewed as a third party upon whose satisfaction the defen-
dant's plea, the prosecutor's promises and ultimately the entire
agreement may be conditioned."
36. See, e.g., A.B.A. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, EC 5-1; DR 5-101-5-107; Cali-
fornia Rules of Professional Conduct, Rules 4-101, 5-101 through 5-103.
37. The traditional unilateral contract envisions the offeror as promisor, while in a
"reverse" unilateral contract the promisor would become the offeree, since the performance
would precede the promise. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRAcTs,§ 57 (illustration 1); 1
CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, § 71.38. The terminology "accept" and "reject" is recited within statutes of nearly every state
to indicate the ratification function of the judiciary. See note 86 infra.
39. On occasion, hopefully rare, a judge may bypass the prosecutor and negotiate charge,
sentence, or both with the defendant or defense counsel directly. When this event occurs, the
judge becomes a surrogate prosecutor and a principal party to the plea agreement. This
practice is discouraged by the A.B.A. and by the statutes in some states.




The consideration which binds the obligations of the parties to a
guilty plea agreement varies. The agreements are known as plea
bargains, as the Supreme Court noted in Santobello.11 A bargain is
a mutual exchange of equivalents-of a quid pro quo.'2 The ex-
change may involve a promise for a promise, a promise for a per-
formance, or a performance for a performance, although to create a
unilateral contract at least one of the exchanges must be a perform-
ance. In practice few, if any, exchanges are equivalents precisely in
value; but some resemble each other more than others. Thus, while
a bargain is an agreement, not every agreement constitutes a bar-
gain. For this reason, use of the word "bargain" in the context of
guilty plea agreements may not be appropriate in every instance,
and should be avoided whenever possible.
Separate consideration passes from each party to the other during
the birth of any contract. Consideration supplied by a prosecutor to
induce a defendant to plead guilty to a criminal charge may be more
tangible than consideration provided by the defendant to the prose-
cutor. Nevertheless, consideration flows from each party to the
other, and should be discussed separately in specific relation to its
source.
1. Consideration from Prosecutor to Defendant
It is common for a prosecutor to supply one or more of at least
four varieties of consideration, alone or in combination, to a defen-
dant who is contemplating the tender of a guilty plea. These varie-
ties include horizontal charge reduction, vertical charge reduction,
sentence recommendation, and forbearance of other action.
a. Horizontal Charge Reduction
In most jurisdictions, judges are unwilling (and sometimes un-
able) to impose consecutive sentences against a defendant except
under unusual circumstances. Seldom are consecutive sentences
41. 404 U.S. 257, 260.
42. A quid pro quo indicates the exchange of this for that, rather than of something for
nothing. Just as not every agreement is a contract (in absence of legal obligation(s) binding




imposed for more than two separate offenses, even if an offender has
committed numerous different criminal transactions.4 3 Thus, if a
defendant has been charged with a multitude of separate offenses
(or separate counts of the same substantive offense), to prosecute
such a defendant for more than a fraction of these charges would be
meaningless in terms of sentence. For this reason, a prosecutor who
is confronted with a choice between a trial or a negotiated disposi-
tion for a defendant against whom multiple charges are pending
may opt for dismissing most of the charges in exchange for the
defendant's plea of guilty to one or two charges. This variety of
consideration flowing from prosecutor to defendant may be labelled
a "horizontal charge reduction," since the quantity of separate
charges rather than the seriousness of any given charge constitutes
the value of the concession.
Ideally, a prosecutor would prefer to dismiss the less serious
charges pending against a defendant in exchange for the latter's
guilty plea to the more serious charges. In practice, however, a de-
fendant who has been charged with numerous crimes is likely to be
permitted to plead guilty to charges other than the least or the most
serious." Some prosecutors will attempt at least to require the de-
fendant whose charges have arisen out of different criminal transac-
tions to plead guilty to crimes resulting from at least two separate
transactions. 45
43. Reasons for this practice vary and often become confused with excuses that cloud the
underlying basis for such a decision. The reason that is offered most frequently is that because
prisons are overcrowded, judges must be selective both in whom they commit to confinement
and in the length of any given prison sentence they do impose. Underlying reasons may be
much more complex or even nonexistent. For instance, a judge may not want to take the time
to impose consecutive sentences, or he may feel that consecutive sentences serve little or no
useful purpose, because substantive justice can be achieved by increasing or decreasing the
expected duration of a single sentence (after all, one five year sentence may be the same as
two sentences of 2.5 years each). A consecutive sentence is likely to have adverse impact upon
an offender's future chances for parole, however, and many judges seem reluctant to constrain
parole boards in this fashion.
44. For instance, when a defendant stands charged with one serious crime (such as armed
robbery) and two less serious offenses (such as simple assault and theft), he may be permitted
to plead guilty to one charge (such as larceny from the person) which is less serious than
armed robbery but more serious than theft. To avoid this likelihood that serious offenders
will be able to "average-out" their punishments by negotiating a plea agreement, some
prosecutors require that each defendant plead guilty to at least one charge which falls within
the highest range of seriousness (such as a class B felony in New York where the defendant
is charged with first degree robbery (B felony), first degree forgery (C felony), and first degree
criminal trespass (D felony)) among the array of crimes charged.
45. A defendant who is charged with robbing ten persons during a single holdup might
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Horizontal charge reduction may be preceded by horizontal over-
charging as an impetus to start the guilty plea negotiation process
rolling. A defendant who has been charged with five felonies may
be more willing to plead guilty to at least one felony than another
defendant who has been charged initially with only a single felony.
During the course of the Georgetown Project, less horizontal over-
charging was identified than had been expected. The plurality of
charges dismissed in most jurisdictions appeared to be legally suffi-
cient."
b. Vertical Charge Reductions
In addition to, or instead of, horizontal charge reduction, many
defendants opt for an opportunity to plead guilty to an offense
which is less serious than the offense with which they had been
charged. This is particularly true of defendants against whom very
few charges remain outstanding. It is true of nearly all defendants
who have been charged with a criminal offense for the first time in
their lives, especially if the charge is a felony. This variety of consid-
eration flowing from prosecutor to defendant may be labelled a
vertical charge reduction, since the seriousness of the individual
charges instead of the quantity of separate charges constitutes the
value of the concession.
The most significant vertical reduction is from a felony to a mis-
demeanor charge. Most prosecutors will not permit this to happen
by negotiation unless the original felony was of a low grade or unless
evidence supporting a higher grade of felony has become weak. The
ABA standards recommended that in a situation where the serious-
ness of a charge is reduced, the lesser offense should bear some
relationship to the greater offense. The most common reduction is
be permitted to plead guilty-to one charge of robbery, for example, whereas another defendant
who is charged with robbing the same number of victims during five separate holdups might
be required to plead guilty to at least two charges of robbery.
46. A charge is legally sufficient if the elements of the crime (actus reus and mens rea
plus proper jurisdiction and timely prosecution) appear to be present at the time the charge
is filed. It is difficult if not impossible ever to assess with certainty the trial sufficiency of a
charge which reaches a disposition (such as by plea of guilty or nolo contendere) without a
trial. Factors involved in trial sufficiency include: availability and quality of witnesses, age
of real evidence, reputation of the defendant in the community, inter alia. See Jacoby,
Summary of Pre-Trial Screening Evaluation, Phase I, (monograph submitted by the Bureau
of Social Science Research, Inc. to the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration) (1975).
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to a lesser included offense (LIO), where the relationship is obvious.
It is common for a defendant to plead guilty to a lesser but nonin-
cluded offense or even to a nonincluded offense of virtually equal
magnitude, for a special purpose such as avoidance of the social
stigma associated with a sex offense conviction.
Vertical charge reduction may be preceded by vertical overcharg-
ing also, since a defendant who has been charged with an offense
carrying a potential life sentence tends to be more eager to plead
guilty to some lesser grade of felony. The Georgetown Project ob-
served less vertical overcharging than had been expected. Jurisdic-
tions which do abuse the charging process are likely to utilize a form
reflecting the method by which crimes are classified in the state. 7
c. Sentence Recommendation
In addition to a horizontal or vertical charge reduction, most de-
fendants opt for an agreement in which the prosecutor promises to
make, or to abstain from making, a specific recommendation to the
court on the matter of the defendant's sentence. In nearly every
jurisdiction, the prosecutor is afforded an opportunity by the court
to tender a sentence recommendation. Most judges admit that they
will often be persuaded by a prosecutor's recommendation, espe-
cially if the recommendation is favorable to the defendant. If a
favorable recommendation cannot be obtained, a prosecutor's si-
lence at the time of sentencing is preferable to a negative recom-
mendation from a defendant's point of view. Unless aggravating
circumstances surrounding commission of the crime are communi-
cated to a judge he is likely to impose a sentence of average severity
even if the offender's conduct may have been peculiarly reprehensi-
ble. Seldom does information contained in a presentence investiga-
tion report provide a judge with sufficient insight into an offender's
character to facilitate substantive justice."
47. In states such as New York which have a statutory classification system (classes A-E
for felonies; A-B for misdemeanors) of crimes, most offenses seem to be reduced one grade at
least during the negotiation process. In states which do not have such a system, crimes are
reduced frequently by generic seriousness (e.g., from armed to unarmed robbery). Conse-
quently, during the screening process prosecutors do not always resist the temptation to
overcharge as a means of compensation-to increase what appears to be a class D felony, for
example, to a class C felony; or a strongarm robbery to armed robbery.
48. This is one complaint heard consistently during the course of interviewing judges
during the Georgetown Project. Most judges admit that presentence investigation reports are
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d. Forbearance of Other Action
A prosecutor may decide to refrain from filing additional criminal
charges against a defendant in exchange for the latter's guilty plea.
Similarly, a prosecutor may agree that special allegations will not
be filed against a defendant in conjunction with the charge to which
the defendant pleads guilty. Special allegations, if filed, might aver
that the defendant is a predicate (recidivist or habitual) felony of-
fender" for whom enhanced punishment is warranted; or that the
defendant possessed or used a weapon during commission of the
offense charged. 0 Also, a prosecutor may refrain from initiating
probation or parole revocation proceedings related to previous con-
victions for which the defendant was on conditional release at the
time when the offense in question occurred. Less frequently, a prose-
cutor might agree not to file criminal charges against the defen-
dant's friends or relatives, particularly if the other persons might
otherwise be named as the defendant's accomplice or co-
conspirator.
2. Consideration from Defendant to Prosecutor
In the ordinary course of events, a prosecutor receives some value
in return for a defendant's guilty plea, even if the defendant has
received a substantial benefit. The offices of most state prosecutors
throughout America operate at full trial capacity throughout the
year, and, regardless of what may be the level of capacity in a given
jurisdiction, prosecutors in most judicial units perceive that the
peak of their trial capacity has long since been reached. Accurately
not completed sufficiently far in advance to enable proper scrutiny by them; that the reports
are prepared inadequately and incompletely; and that in the final analysis a judge who
sentences an offender following a guilty plea more so than after a trial is unaware of most
aggravating or mitigating circumstances necessary to be considered in applying substantive
justice.
49. Statutes in most states provide for at least some enhancement of punishment for
offenders who had prior convictions (especially prior felony convictions) at the time when they
committed the crime presently in question. Patterns vary among states, and range from
discretionary enhancement at the court's option (e.g., VA. CODE, § 53-296) to a doubling of
the penalty for the first offense (e.g., ALAs. STAT., § 12.55.050(1)) to the imposition of a life
term of imprisonment (DEL. CODE, tit. 11, § 3911(a)). However, most of these statutes man-
date the higher penalty only if the previous convictions are alleged in the indictment for the
current offense by the prosecutor, and thus become the subject of the plea negotiation process.
50. Statutes in some states enhance the penalty for an offender who possesses or uses a
weapon during commission of a crime. See, e.g., CONN. STAT., § 54-118(a).
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or not, they feel precluded from bringing to trial more than a fixed
number of cases at a time.5 Based on this assumption, for them to
bring one case to trial means that at least one other case which
otherwise would have been tried must be disposed of in some other
way.52
A prosecutor benefits from the caseload reduction achieved when-
ever a defendant pleads guilty and eliminates the need for a trial.
When a conviction can be obtained against a defendant without
trial, the victim of the crime will be spared the trauma of public
testimony and embarrassing cross-examination; the resources of the
prosecutor's investigative staff can be concentrated on other and
possibly more important cases; and the state may be spared the
almost prohibitive expense of transporting witnesses to trial from
distant localities. Most important, undoubtedly, is the greater cer-
tainty that conviction will be final after a guilty plea than after a
trial. During a trial the defense counsel enjoys an unlimited oppor-
tunity to maneuver both the prosecution and the trial judge into
procedural errors which may compel a reversal of the conviction and
a new trial for the defendant. 53
Some authorities have theorized that an offender's progress to-
ward rehabilitation will be inspired by his admission of guilt.54
Whether this is true or not, a guilty plea does result in easing the
conscience of the prosecutor and the general public. A defendant
who is convicted of a crime following a trial has been proven guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt, but a question of innocence may linger.
A defendant who pleads guilty to a crime knowingly and voluntar-
ily55 cannot be totally blameless. 5 In short, the guilty-pleading de-
51. A common expression is that there are 240 working days per year, and that a felony
trial requires at least one and often two-three days to complete. Therefore, most prosecutors
interviewed during the Georgetown Project noted their perception, however accurate, of a
ceiling on the number of cases within their judicial unit which could feasibly be brought to
trial each year. Usually, this capacity did not exceed ten percent of the pending caseload.
52. These cases must either be dismissed or be terminated by means of a guilty plea or a
plea of nolo contendere.
53. In addition, the guilty plea may reduce the length of and need for pretrial confine-
ment; protect the public from those who might otherwise be set free on pre-trial release; and
it may shorten the time interval between charge and conviction. Santobello v. New York, 404
U.S. 257, 261 (1971).
54. Id. See also Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 751-52 (1969).
55. Without being both knowing and voluntary, however, a guilty plea is void. See, e.g.,
Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969); McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969).
But see also Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1969); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S.
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fendant quiets the controversy surrounding his wrong-doing.
C. Conditions
Most guilty plea agreements are predicated upon the fulfillment
of one or more conditions. These may be conditions precedent or
conditions subsequent, and each may be expressed in the agree-
ment, or implied in fact or in law (constructive conditions). Differ-
ent agreements contain different conditions, but a number of simi-
larities are discernible within most guilty plea agreements from
state to state, and these are worthy of individual notation.
1. Conditions Precedent
Most conditions that are applicable to guilty plea agreements are
conditions precedent and as such must be fulfilled before the parties
to the agreement incur binding legal obligations under an emerging
contract. It may be helpful to discuss varieties of conditions preced-
ent separately in relation to the conduct of the parties.
a. Defendant's Conduct
Before any guilty plea agreement can achieve juristic effect, the
defendant must waive his constitutional rights to a jury trial,57 to
confront his accusers,5 to present witnesses in his own defense, 5 to
remain silent, 0 and to be convicted by proof beyond a reasonable
doubt.6" Although these underlying rights are procedural, the waiv-
ers thereof should be regarded as being substantive waivers, since
by his forbearance a defendant relinquishes the fundamental pro-
tection afforded by our judicial process:
In addition to substantive conditions precedent, a defendant
759 (1969); and Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1969).
56. This was the almost exclusive assumption among prosecutors prior to North Carolina
v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). Since Alford, defendants in some states have been permitted
to plead guilty to criminal charges without admitting either legal or factual guilt. The as-
sumption continues to linger, however. Note warning five in Rule 11(c), FED. R. CRiM. P., note
67 infra.
57. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
58. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
59. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
60. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
61. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
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must fulfill several procedural conditions precedent before a guilty
plea agreement can achieve juristic effect. He must show the court
before the plea is tendered that his waiver of each constitutional
right is done voluntarily, 2 knowingly and intelligently,63 and that he
understands the elements of the charge to which he is pleading, 4 as
well as at least the direct consequences 5 of the conviction66 which
will result from a judgment based on a plea of guilty. When required
by the court, a defendant is expected to supply for the record his
personal account of the factual basis for the plea,67 and to recite for
62. "[A] plea of guilty shall not be accepted unless made voluntarily after proper advice
and with full understanding of the consequences." Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220,
223. "A guilty plea, if induced by promise or threats which deprive it of the character of a
voluntary act, is void." Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 493 (1962).
63. "[A] plea of guilty entered by one fully aware of the direct consequences, including
the actual value of any commitments made to him by court, prosecutor, or his own counsel,
must stand unless induced by threats (or promises to discontinue improper harassment),
misrepresentations (including unfulfilled or unfulfillable promises) or perhaps by promise
. . . having no proper relationship to the prosecutor's business (e.g. bribes)." Brady v. United
States, 397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970), citing 242 F.2d at 115.
As Brady suggests implicitly, the voluntary and intelligent standards are often confused
with each other and may be distinguished ambiguously. See The Guilty Plea as a Waiver of
Rights and as an Admission of Guilt, 44 TEMPLE L.Q. 540, 545 (1971).
64. The defendant's understanding of each element of the charge(s) to which he contem-
plates pleading guilty or nolo contendere is especially important under Rule 11(c), FED. R.
CrM. P. and under similar statutes that have been enacted in those states that have adopted
part or all of Rule 11(c). The "factual basis" for the plea may be required to be set forth on
record, also, to "ensure that the defendant is guilty of a crime at least as serious as that to
which he is entering his plea." Beaman v. State, 221 N.W.2d 698, 700 (Minn. 1974).
65. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970). Note, however, that while direct
consequences (such as knowledge of minimum and maximum sentence possibilities, consecu-
tive sentence availability, and special sentencing alternatives) must be outlined to a defen-
dant contemplating a guilty plea, indirect consequences need not be in most jurisdictions.
See, e.g., United States v. Sambro, 454 F.2d 918 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (deportation is a collateral
consequence); Cuthrell v. Director, Patuxent Institution, 475 F.2d 1365 (4th Cir. 1973) (com-
mitment to a mental institution is a collateral consequence); Weaver v. United States, 454
F.2d 315 (7th Cir. 1971) (revocation of probation is a collateral consequence); United States
v. Casanova's Inc., 350 F. Supp. 291 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (civil disability such as loss of a business
license is collateral consequence).
66. A conviction results from a plea of guilty or of nolo contendere just as if the defendant
stood trial and was found guilty by a court or jury verdict. Kercheval v. United States, 274
U.S. 220 (1927).
67. See note 34 supra. Under Rule 11(c), FED. R. CuM. P., the court must address the
defendant personally in open court and inform the defendant of, and determine that he
understands, the following: (1) the nature of the charge and the mandatory minimum plus
the mandatory maximum penalty provided by law; (2) the defendant's right to be represented
by counsel at every stage of the proceedings, and to have counsel appointed if he cannot afford
to retain one; (3) the defendant's right to plead not guilty and to persist in that plea by
demanding a trial by jury together with an opportunity to confront and cross-examine wit-
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the record his age, educational level, and a synopsis of the discus-
sion he has enjoyed in consultation with his defense attorney.6s
Some courts will request a defendant to capitulate for the record in
his own words the material terms of the agreement on which tender
of the guilty plea is based." If a written instrument is required by
law or custom to memorialize the guilty plea event, the defendant
must execute portions of the document in his own handwriting, and
at the very least subscribe his signature and acknowledge the same
under oath. 0
b. Prosecutor's Conduct
In any given jurisdiction, conditions precedent which are required
of the prosecutor may be fewer in number than those required of a
defendant in order to give juristic effect to a guilty plea agreement.
In some states, the prosecutor must make a sentence recommenda-
tion before the defendant tenders the plea.7 When a condition such
as this is required by statute or rule, it is implied in law and there-
fore serves as a constructive condition precedent to the emergence
of any guilty plea contract providing for a sentence recommendation
by the prosecutor. In states where the prosecutor's sentence recom-
mendation does not have to be made prior to the defendant's tender
of a plea, the agreement itself may require this sequence of events
nesses against him; and his right not to be compelled to incriminate himself; (4) that if he
pleads guilty or nolo contendere there will not be a trial of any kind, trial being waived by
the plea itself; and (5) that if he pleads guilty or nolo the court may ask questions about the
offense(s) to which he pleads, and that if he answers these questions under oath on the record
and in the presence of his counsel these answers may be used against him in a prosecution
for perjury or false statement.
68. The current practice in most courts is to elicit from the defendant on the record as
much extemporaneous information about himself, his alleged offense(s), and his discussion(s)
with counsel about the contemplated guilty plea as possible. The belief is that while a
defendant may be successful in attacking collaterally a conviction obtained by a guilty plea
on grounds that he nodded or grunted in response to the court's questions without fully
understanding the meaning thereof, that such a collateral attack would be unsuccessful if the
admissions were in the defendant's own words.
69. The material terms of the agreement, which necessarily comprise the consideration,
reflect the quid pro quo (see note 42 supra) and, if recited by the defendant in his own words,
will show that he believed he was getting something in exchange for his plea. An appellate
tribunal might be more loathe to upset a conviction predicated upon a "good deal" for the
defendant compared with a "poor deal."
70. See, e.g., Rule 17.4(a), AiZ. R. CraM. P. and Criminal Rule 4.2(g), WASH. SUPER. CT.
R.
71. See, e.g., IND. STATs., tit. 35, § 35-5-6-2(a).
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by its expressed terms or by implication in fact.72
In most jurisdictions, the court will require the prosecutor to sum-
marize for the record the factual basis for the guilty plea, together
with the material terms of an underlying plea agreement if one
exists.73 A number of courts demand that a prosecutor recite on the
record his reasons for agreeing to either charge or sentence conces-
sions. 74 This sort of conduct, when mandated of a prosecutor by law
or custom, may be viewed as a condition precedent to a guilty plea
contract.
An agreement is likely to contain expressed provisions detailing
the specific charge concessions which a prosecutor may have agreed
to permit in consideration of the defendant's guilty plea. Specifi-
cally, an agreement may call for the prosecutor to make a motion
to dismiss or to nolle prosequi one or more companion charges pend-
ing against the defendant. 75 The order of events entails ordinarily
the dismissal or nolle being made immediately following either the
defendant's tender of a plea or the court's ratification thereof. If
there is no bar to reinstatement of the charges" upon failure of the
defendant's plea, whether companion charges are dropped before or
after tender of the plea is immaterial. A condition requiring a prose-
cutor to dismiss or nolle companion charges should not be viewed
as a condition subsequent even if the prosecutor's motion is made
72. The agreement may recite a time limit within which the recommendation must be
made, and the defendant may rely to his detriment on this as on any other promise by the
prosecutor. Similarly, trade usage and custom in the locality may cause a defendant to
presume that a recommendation will be made at or before a specific time even without
mention of the time in the agreement proper, in which case the time limitation may be
implied in fact.
73. Disclosure of an underlying plea agreement is mandated under Rule 11(e), FED. R.
CaM. P. and under similar statutes that have been enacted in those states that have adopted
part or all of Rule 11(e). See also People v. West, 477 P.2d 409 (Cal. 1970); Shavie v. State,
182 N.W.2d 505 (Wis. 1971).
74. This is likely to be a personal demand made by many judges who insist that the
prosecutor must be willing to "share the risk of blame" with the court in the event that a
resulting sentence reduction achieves adverse publicity. The latter situation may occur when,
in choosing between confinement and probation the court imposes a sentence of probation,
only to have the defendant re-arrested shortly thereafter for commiting a more serious crime.
75. A criminal charge may be terminated without trial by the defendant's plea of guilty
or of nolo contendere, or by dismissal of the charge in a prosecutor's discretion through nolle
prosequi, or by dismissal of the charge by the court following a finding of no probable cause
or of insufficient evidence based upon a preliminary or an evidentiary hearing.
76. Charges may be dismissed either with or without prejudice against reinstatement at




following defendant's tender of a plea, since no valid judgment
could be entered on the plea until after fulfillment of this condition.
Normally, the parties anticipate this condition to be fulfilled coter-
minously, and indeed this condition might be regarded as being
concurrent with the defendant's plea tender. A concurrent condition
is a condition precedent."
c. Judicial Conduct
Most guilty plea agreements are conditioned upon the satisfaction
of one very important third party-the judge who must ratify the
guilty plea and the agreement before either acquires juristic effect.
Under the laws of many states, primarily those which have
adopted Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 8 the
judge before whom a guilty plea is tendered must cause an allocu-
tion" to appear on record as a condition precedent to announcing
his satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the plea. Failure of a judge
to make proper inquiry of a defendant on record in a Rule 11 juris-
diction will invalidate the guilty plea and void any judgment based
thereon. 0 In contrast, some states have held that such a ritual is not
a necessary condition precedent to judicial ratification of a guilty
plea agreement.8'
2. Conditions Subsequent
In the guilty plea context, most conditions precedent seem to
relate to conduct by the defendant, while nearly all conditions sub-
sequent relate to conduct by the prosecutor. Now and then, a defen-
dant may agree to cooperate with the prosecution by turning state's
evidence as part of a plea agreement. However, if the defendant fails
to testify as expected following the disposition of pending charges,
the prosecutor retains very few, if any, weapons to enforce this as-
pect of the agreement. In effect, once a defendant tenders a guilty
plea little more can be demanded of him.
77. RESTATEMENT OF CoNTRAcrs, § 251.
78. See note 34 supra.
79. See, e.g., Rule 32(c)(1), D. C. SUPER. CT. CriM. Div. R.
80. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969); McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459
(1969).
81. See, e.g., James v. State, 242 Md. 424, 219 A.2d 17 (1966).
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The most common condition subsequent associated with a guilty
plea agreement involves a condition requiring the prosecutor to
make a sentence recommendation to the court at a point in time
which will occur following tender and ratification of the plea. In
most jurisdictions, a sentence recommendation is made on the day
when sentence is scheduled to be imposed, which in turn may be
several weeks after judgment has been entered pursuant to an ear-
lier tendered and ratified plea, to allow time for preparation of a pre-
sentence investigation report. This type of a condition subsequent
is likely to consist of a duty without a promise by the prosecutor.
The duty is for the prosecutor to make the sentence recommenda-
tion as contemplated by the defendant when the agreement was
struck. Without language of promise within the agreement to show
that the prosecutor guaranteed a specific sentence, the prosecutor
will not be held responsible for failure of the court to follow the
recommendation.8 2
A prosecutor must discharge a duty imposed by a condition subse-
quent to a plea agreement, notwithstanding the likelihood that to
do so may be futile. Santobello makes this clear. There the Supreme
Court vacated the sentence due exclusively to the prosecutor's fail-
ure to make a sentence recommendation on which the defendant
had earlier relied to his detriment by tendering a guilty plea, 3 even
though the trial judge indicated that he intended to impose the
maximum sentence despite any recommendation to'the contrary. 4
82. See, e.g., United States v. Cravatas, 330 F. Supp. 91 (D. Conn. 1971), where the court
refused to allow withdrawal of a guilty plea merely because the sentence actually imposed
was more severe than the defendant expected; Abrams v. Warden, 333 F. Supp. 612 (D. Md.
1971), where defendant was sentenced to imprisonment but expected probation. As the Sec-
ond Circuit said in United States v. Needles, 472 F.2d 652 (2d Cir. 1973), defendant's surprise
at disclosure of a prejudicial presentence investigation report and consequent sentence more
severe than expected did not automatically entitle him to plea withdrawal. On the other
hand, if a defendant is misled rather than merely surprised, withdrawal may be mandated.
See United States v. Lester, 247 F.2d 496 (2d Cir. 1957), where the defendant's surprise
stemmed from a prosecutor's promise rather than mere recommendation as to sentence; and
People v. Wright, 314 N.E.2d 733 (Ill. 1974), where defendant was misled by the prosecutor
into believing the latter's sentence recommendation was binding.
83. 404 U.S. 257, 258 (1971). A series of delays due primarily to tardiness in the prepara-
tion of a presentence investigation report caused an elapse of more than six months between
the tender of appellant's plea on June 16, 1969, and January 9, 1970 when sentence was finally
imposed. Id. Another prosecutor appeared at time of sentencing, replacing the one who had
negotiated the plea. Id. at 259.
84. Id. at 259-60. The sentencing judge declared: "I am not at all influenced by what the
District Attorney says, so that there is no need to adjourn the sentence, and there is no need
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Ill. JUDICIAL RATIFICATION OF THE GUILTY PLEA
A defendant who has been charged with a criminal offense does
not possess a right to have judgment entered pursuant to his tender
of a guilty plea." By statute in most states, a judge before whom a
guilty plea is tendered is invested with discretion to accept or to
reject the plea." If the judge does accept the plea, he retains author-
ity to concur or not to concur in the underlying plea agreement, if
one exists.87 The better view is to regard the judge as a third party
upon whose satisfaction the guilty plea agreement is conditioned,,"
rather than as a principal party to the making of the agreement
itself. In this way, the role of the judge becomes to ratify or not to
ratify the plea as tendered together with other conditions upon
which the plea may have been premised in the agreement.
The condition precedent of third party (judicial) satisfaction is
present expressly or implicitly in every guilty plea agreement. Even
if not expressed, it is a constructive condition in every agreement
for a guilty plea, being implied in law in every state.8" If the judge
were simply to ratify a plea agreement as drafted at the moment the
plea is tendered, the condition of judicial satisfaction would be easy
to understand. While some judges do this, many do not, and judicial
satisfaction which is itself a condition of a guilty plea agreement,
becomes imposed conditionally in turn.9 Once this happens, as it
does frequently, the resulting contractual implications become diffi-
cult to interpret and it is not hard to envision that in the ensuing
to have any testimony. It doesn't make a particle of difference what the District Attorney
says he will do, or what he doesn't do." Id.
85. Lynch v: Overholser, 369 U.S. 705, 719 (1962).
86. See, e.g., Rule 402(2), hL. S. CT. R.; Rule 15, Wyo. R. Crm. P.
87. See, e.g., Rule 3.171(c), FLA. R. CaiM. P.
88. The condition (precedent) of third party satisfaction is well-known to the law of
contracts. It is often a constructive condition, being implied in law. See 3A CoRBIN ON
Cor Tcr § 645. Such a condition has been used typically in construction contracts requiring
that a certificate of approval (evidencing satisfaction) be issued by a prenamed architect or
engineer as a condition-precedent to payment of the contractor's final installment.
89. Third party satisfaction by the judge before whom a guilty plea is tendered is required
by law in every jurisdiction, since there is no absolute right for a defendant to have a judg-
ment entered pursuant to a guilty plea. Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705, 719 (1962).
90. When judicial satisfaction is imposed conditionally or provisionally (see infra, Part
III(C) and (D)), the court must be certain that the defendant understands the court is not
bound by the antecedent plea agreement. Generally, the defendant must be given an oppor-
tunity to withdraw or "affirm" his guilty plea notwithstanding the aleatory nature of the
satisfaction. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STATS., § 16-7-207(2)(e); TEx. C. CirM. P., § 26.13(a)(2).
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confusion the misapprehension of the defendant may become phe-.
nomenal.
The judicial ratification process entails necessarily two
phases-ratification of the charges to which the plea is tendered and
ratification of the sentence recommendation contemplated in the
plea agreement. In most states, therefore, the judge before whom a
guilty plea is tendered pursuant to an underlying agreement is em-
powered to choose among five alternatives: (1) ratify the plea to the
charges as tendered and ratify the sentence recommendation as
drafted in the agreement; (2) ratify the plea to the charges as tend-
ered but ratify the sentence recommendation contemplated in the
agreement conditionally or provisionally; (3) ratify the plea to the
charges as tendered but refuse to ratify the sentence recommenda-
tion contemplated in the agreement; (4) ratify the plea to the
charges conditionally or provisionally and delay consideration of the
sentence recommendation; and (5) refuse to ratify the plea to the
charges as tendered, in which instance the issue of ratifying the
sentence recommendation abates. There may be other combinations
or permutations of this ratification process, but these five should
serve to outline the complexity and the variety of choices. Each
merits a separate analysis.
A. Ratification of the Plea as Tendered and of the Sentence
Recommendation as Drafted
The easiest choice which a judge may make is to ratify the plea
as tendered and thereupon to ratify also the sentence recommended
in the agreement. Since this is the easiest choice, it seems to be
followed by the average judge in most judicial units throughout the
United States.9' A judge who exercises this choice repeatedly may
be considered to have abdicated his judicial function and conferred
upon the prosecutor the de facto authority to act as a surrogate
jurist. In less creditable but equally accurate terminology, such a
judge acts as a "rubber stamp" and simply imprimaturs the charge
and sentencing decisions made by the prosecutor. This course of
91. Interviews and observations conducted during the Georgetown Project revealed that
in nearly every judicial unit studied the plurality of jurists follow the prosecutors' sentencing
recommendations unfailingly. At least one judge in most large jurisdictions deviates from this
norm, often to the point where he ignores such recommendations completely or even forbids
prosecutors from making recommendations at all.
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action offers the most certainty to a defendant that his negotiated
agreement will be ratified without alteration.
When both the plea to the charges as tendered and the agreement
on sentence as drafted are ratified judicially, the condition of third
party (judicial) satisfaction is fulfilled at the time the plea is tend-
ered by the defendant. As long as justice was accomplished by both
the negotiation of the charges and the negotiation of the sentence,
there is little about which to complain. However, this ratification
pattern ignores the need for a sentencing judge to review and be
guided by the presentence investigation report of the defendant.
While justice delayed may be justice denied, the same result may
occur when justice is administered too swiftly and on a pro forma
basis. For this reason, thoughtful judges who bear in mind the need
to protect the community from the predatory conduct of the of-
fender" who avoids prolonged incapacitation through his capability
for plea bargaining tend to be reluctant to follow this ratification
pattern. Contractual complexity may be the result.
B. Ratification of the Plea as Tendered but of the Sentence
Recommendation Conditionally or Provisionally
As an alternative to ratifying both the plea as tendered and the
sentence recommendation as drafted in the plea agreement, some
judges will ratify the plea as tendered but the sentence recommen-
dation only conditionally or provisionally. A common example is the
judge who will accept a guilty plea to one count of theft (larceny)
when the offender was charged originally with two counts of robbery
(hence, the defendant has received both horizontal and vertical
charge concessions) but who prefers to delay ratification of the pros-
ecutor's sentence recommendation pending receipt and scrutiny of
a pre-sentence investigation report.
Ordinarily, if the judge ratifies the sentence recommendation con-
ditionally he reserves the right to modify the sentence if the present-
ence investigation report reveals the defendant's criminal history to
be substantially different from that represented by counsel to the
92. The sophisticated offender who has been through the criminal justice process before
learns from his prior mistakes-at least procedurally. All defendants are not alike, nor is it
reasonable to believe that the prosecutor's recommendation will be just or even prudent all
of the time. The criminal justice process, when working properly, should operate as a system
of checks and balances and the judge should serve as an operating rather than a silent partner
to administer justice actively and not merely passively.
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court. As long as the report buttresses the representations of coun-
sel, the defendant can expect that the sentence recommendation
will be ratified eventually. 3 On the other hand, a judge may ratify
sentence recommendation provisionally, reserving the right to alter
the ratification and modify the sentence if specific events should
take place between the time of the plea tender and imposition of
sentence."
This ratification pattern should not impose undue hardship on a
defendant, since the conditions or the provisions are identified
clearly by the court and the defendant is admonished as to what
action, if any, must be taken to ensure eventual ratification of the
recommended sentence. Judges who follow this pattern of ratifica-
tion tend to be concerned with rehabilitation and reintegration of
the offender back into the community. This type of judge is less
concerned about the charges than about the sanction to be imposed,
and solicits the cooperation of the defendant in determining the
proper sanctions in an effort to achieve some measure at least of
substantive justice.
C. Ratification of the Plea as Tendered but Refusal to Ratify the
Sentence Recommendation as Drafted
Another alternative which is available to a judge before whom a
guilty plea is tendered is to ratify the plea to the charges as tendered
but to refuse to ratify the sentence recommendation as drafted in
the plea agreement. Only a minority of judges follow this course of
action routinely. However, from time to time nearly every judge
may be called upon to deny the sentence recommendation which he
feels has been negotiated without due regard for the protection of
93. A conditional ratification may be understood as being similar to a fee simple condi-
tional. The ratification will continue in full force and effect as long as no information is
received by the judge which refutes the representations of counsel. Thus, for the conditional
ratification to be defeated, not only must the representations of counsel be erroneous, but
the judge must learn of the error. Seldom does a discrepancy in this sort of information surface
even if it does exist.
94. A provisional ratification may be understood as being similar to an estate on condition
subsequent. The ratification does not achieve full force and effect until it is reevaluated at a
specific point in time in view of the totality of circumstances known at that time. New
knowledge may come to light and it may be beneficial or detrimental to the defendant, but
unlike the conditional ratification the provisional ratification will not be reversed necessarily
because the new information is detrimental, nor will it be continued necessarily because the
information is beneficial. A provisional ratification is more aleatory than a conditional one.
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the community. The derivative question which emerges immedi-
ately is whether as a result of this judicial non ratification of the
sentence recommendation the defendant should be permitted to
withdraw tender of his plea to the charges. A second derivative
question is whether the judge must or should make a revelation of
the sentence which he prefers to impose prior to the moment when
the defendant is called upon to withdraw or to reaffirm his plea. 5
Whenever the judge refuses to ratify the sentence recommenda-
tion made by the prosecutor pursuant to a guilty plea agreement,
the actual sentence which will be imposed eventually becomes an
aleatory matter. As a result, the defendant is put into a position of
mistrust, uncertainty, and worry. For some judges, this practice is
followed routinely as a part of the punishment process intended to
unnerve defendants. For other judges, this ratification pattern is
followed in an effort to prolong the sentencing decision. In either
event, it does not seem necessary or prudent to delay announcement
of the sentencing decision for any longer than is absolutely necessary
following tender and ratification of the guilty plea itself.
D. Ratification of the Plea Conditionally or Provisionally and
Delay of Sentence
Until the plea is ratified as tendered or retendered as suggested
by the court to ensure ratification, the issue of a sentence must be
delayed. On occasion, judges refuse to ratify a guilty plea as tend-
ered, but prefer to ratify the plea to the charges conditionally or
provisionally. Normally, a guilty plea must be ratified or the ratifi-
cation must be refused at the time the plea is tendered. However,
under the laws of a number of states, final disposition of charges
may be made conditionally, provisionally, or delayed altogether
pending the completion of some event to take place in the future.
Such an event may be the defendant's good conduct for a period
such as a year's time, or the defendant's successful completion of a
diversion or a probation program, or the defendant's restitution to
his victim. This type of a disposition may be known locally as an
adjournment in contemplation of dismissal," or as a tentative dispo-
95. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has answered this question
negatively. See United States v. Werker, Docket No. 76-3024 (1976).
96. See, e.g., N.Y. CRimiAL PROCEDUR LAw, § 210.46. This type of alternative sentencing
procedure is known also as deferred prosecution. See, e.g., CoLO. Rav. STATS., § 16-7-401.
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sition. Usually the array of conditions or provisions are recited by
statute and little doubt lingers in the defendant's mind concerning
the conduct required of him to achieve a final disposition of the
charges in question.
E. Refusal to Ratify the Plea as Tendered and Abatement of the
Issue of Sentence
A judge before whom a guilty plea is tendered may exercise the
option to refuse to ratify the plea at all, in which situation the
matter of the sentence will not be reached unless the defendant
submits a revised plea or proceeds to trial and is convicted. It is rare
in most judicial units for a judge to refuse to ratify a tendered guilty
plea altogether, perhaps on account of the necessity for disposing of
criminal cases expeditiously in most courts. 7 When a judge does
refuse to ratify a guilty plea tendered by a defendant, in most juris-
dictions the plea is deemed to have been automatically withdrawn,"
and the defendant is permitted at his own option either to plead
anew or to proceed to trial on the question of his guilt.
IV. REMEDIES FOR DISENCHANTMENT WITH A GUILTY PLEA
AGREEMENT-RESCISSION OR SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE
Two principal remedies may be available to the defendant who
determines that he has entered into a guilty plea agreement improv-
idently. He may petition the court to have the agreement rescinded,
or he may demand specific performance under the terms of the
agreement. In practice, rescission is preferred over specific perform-
ance by courts in most jurisdictions.9
97. By refusing to permit a guilty plea that has been predicated upon a prosecutorial
concession of any kind, the court would compel a defendant to plead guilty "on the nose" as
charged, or to take his case to trial. Throughout this century, most judicial units in this
country have been unable or at least unwilling to take more than 10 percent of their criminal
caseloads to trial, and many of these try fewer than 5 or even 1 percent. See, JONES, CRIME
WImoUr PUNISHwr (1979); Wishingrad, The Plea Bargain in Historical Perspective, 23
BUFF. L. REv. 499 (1974).
98. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE, § 1192.4.
99. See, e.g., Smith and Davis, The Legitimation of Plea Bargaining: Remedies for Bro-
ken Promises, 11 Am. CRiuM. L. REv. 771, 793 (1973). Specific performance may be granted as
the most appropriate remedy in selected cases. See, e.g., People v. DeWolfe, 36 A.D.2d 618,
318 N.Y.S.2d 810 (1971); State v. Kimes, 195 N.W.2d 216 (Neb. 1972); United States v.
Ewing, 480 F.2d 1141 (5th Cir. 1973); and United States v. Hallam, 472 F.2d 168 (9th Cir.
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Prior to the defendant's tender of the plea itself, neither of these
remedies should be necessary, since the defendant should be capa-
ble of unilaterally repudiating a plea agreement merely by failing
to tender the plea. This is simple enough for a defendant to do in
jurisdictions which require tender of the plea to be made in open
court by the defendant personally.' °0 If tender may be accomplished
constructively by the defendant in absentia, as by means of a writ-
ten petition to be delivered to and filed with the court by counsel,'0'
repudiation should be feasible by causing the instrument to be in-
tercepted and destroyed prior to delivery or filing.
Once the defendant has tendered a guilty plea, however, a greater
difficulty may be encountered if either the defendant or the prosecu-
tor should desire to repudiate the plea agreement (or if either should
decide that the agreement has become repudiated). It is accurate
to suggest that once a guilty plea has been tendered by a defendant
the prosecutor will be unsuccessful in disturbing the plea itself. He
may breach conditions associated with the underlying plea agree-
ment, however, at his peril.' 2 At any stage of the criminal justice
process the defendant may be successful in causing his disenchant-
ment with the plea or the agreement to be remedied. The remedies
available will depend upon the point in time when a decision is
made to seek relief. Three stages are crucial to remedies, and partic-
ularly to the most popular and widely granted remedy of rescission.
These stages are post-tender but pre-ratification of the plea; post-
ratification of the plea but pre-imposition of sentence; and post-
imposition of sentence. Each of these stages should be discussed
separately in conjunction with remedies available to defendants at
the time.
1973). In these and other cases, the controversy occurred following sentence and generally
related to the sentence exclusively.
100. This is the rule in most jurisdictions. See note 26, supra.
101. See, e.g., Rule 15.03(2), MINN. R. Camr. P.
102. Some courts will look at whether the defendant relied on the promise even if it has
been broken by the prosecutor. See, e.g., Johnson v. Beto, 466 F.2d 478 (5th Cir. 1972); United
States v. Carter, 454 F.2d 426 (4th Cir. 1972); Villarreal v. United States, 461 F.2d 765 (9th
Cir. 1972); and Walters v. Harris, 460 F.2d 988 (4th Cir. 1972). It has been argued that a
breach per se is not grounds for rescission of a plea agreement or for withdrawal of the plea




A. Post-Tender but Pre-Ratification Remedies
Following tender of a guilty plea, a defendant may be at the
mercy of the court in the event he should desire to recant the tender.
In practice most judges will allow withdrawal of the plea at this
time, as is evidenced by the paucity of case law relating to with-
drawal at this stage. Since judgment has not been entered until
ratification by the court, the criminal justice process is not dis-
turbed by a reversal of the defendant's decision at this juncture.
B. Post-Ratification but Pre-Sentence Remedies
In Georgia alone, the defendant retains the absolute right to uni-
laterally withdraw tender of his guilty plea up to the moment when
sentence is pronounced.'0 In all other jurisdictions, however, per-
mission of the court is required and the standard adhered to gener-
ally is that of "good reason shown."10' Unless the defendant has
demonstrated a habit or propensity for vascillation, most judges will
permit rescission before imposition of sentence. Withdrawal of the
plea will constitute the defendant's repudiation of the agreement
and is likely to discharge the prosecutor from further duty to per-
form thereunder.'15 The defendant will be returned to the status quo
ante. 1M
On the other hand, a defendant may not want to repudiate the
agreement himself, but he may have reason to believe that the
prosecutor repudiated it or breached a condition thereto. Rather
than to seek rescission at this juncture, such a defendant may be
well-advised to demand specific performance as his preferred relief.
103. GA. CRIM. P. LAW, § 27-1404. Judgment is "pronounced" under this law when the
accused is officially informed by the court of the sentence. 12 Ga. App. 615, 77 S.E. 1080.
104. See, e.g., Rule 32(d), DuL. SUPER. CT. CraM. R.; Rule 3.170(0, FLA. R. CuM. P. In
other states, however, withdrawal may be made at this juncture in the discretion of the court
for any reason. See, e.g., Rule 19-1714, IDAHo R. CriM. P.; IOWA CODE, § 777.15; and Rule 8.10,
Ky. R. CRIM. P.
105. This was the result in United States ex rel. Williams v. McMann, 436 F.2d 103 (2d
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 914 (1971). In an opinion by Kaufman, J., the Second Circuit
held that the defendant's successful appeal constituted a revocation of the bargain which in
turn released the prosecutor from further duty. Id. at 106.
106. The defendant will be returned to the status he enjoyed prior to reaching the over-
turned plea agreement. See, e.g., In re Sutherland, 100 Cal. Rptr. 129, 133, 6 Cal. 3d 666,
672, 493 P.2d 857, 861 (1972). In Santobello, Justice Douglas noted that if withdrawal were
permitted, "the petitioner will, of course, plead anew to the original charge on two felony
counts." 404 U.S. 257, 263.
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The defendant is in a good position to argue for specific performance
prior to the imposition of sentence, since he has relied to his detri-
ment by tendering the guilty plea but he still may withdraw his plea
for any good reason'01 in the court's discretion up to pronouncement
of sentence. Neither the court, nor the prosecutor may look forward
to the prospect of returning to preparation for trial so shortly after
the agreement was negotiated, particularly if the breach by the
prosecutor was trivial and is rectifiable without undue burden.
C. Post-Imposition of Sentence Remedies
Both specific performance and rescission are much more difficult
for a defendant to achieve following the imposition of sentence
against him by the court. In most jurisdictions, the plea cannot be
withdrawn at this juncture at the court's unfettered discretion, but
may be withdrawn only to avoid a "manifest injustice. 1' 0 8 Similarly,
most courts will not specifically enforce an antecedent guilty plea
agreement unless no adequate remedy at law exists. 09 The absence
of an adequate legal remedy, together with the, petitioner's "clean
hands" and the absence of laches,"" have been traditional condi-
tions precedent for equitable relief on a contract. The end result has
been that courts are reluctant to permit rescission of a guilty plea
agreement following imposition of a sentence against the defendant,
and that courts are loathe to specifically enforce such an agreement
at this point or after."'
107. See note 104 supra.
108. See, e.g., Rule 26.1, ARK. R. CJUm. P.; Rule 32(d), DEL. SUPER. CT. Cerei. R.; Rule
27.25, Mo. R. S. CT.; and NEV. REv. STAT., § 176.165. Note also that in a few states a
defendant may withdraw following imposition of sentence for any good reason in the court's
discretion. See Rule 95-1902(b), MoNT. C. CRiM. P.
109. The court in Barker v. State, 259 So. 2d 200 (Fla. 1972) made this clear: "In the
absence of a clear showing of irrevocable prejudice to either the prosecution or defense we
are reluctant to extend the status of a 'plea bargain' to that of a specifically enforceable
contract since appropriate relief may ordinarily be afforded otherwise." Id. at 204.
110. In the context of the guilty plea, an opportunity for the defendant to withdraw an
improvident plea is considered to be an adequate remedy at law as a rule, at least if with-
drawal is accomplished prior to imposition of sentence. Sentencing seems to be viewed as the
de facto equivalent of laches, after which it is too late to enforce a prior guilty plea agreement,
moreover, the defendant's "hands" may be viewed as having become "unclean" by reason
of his silence throughout the sentencing ceremony, absent a showing of fraud or other
prejudice, such as judicial misrepresentation of the defendant's exposure to confinement or
death. See, ABA Standards, Pleas of Guilty, 55 (1968); Stidham v. United States, 170 F.2d
294 (8th Cir. 1948); United States v. McGahey, 449 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1971).
111. See note 109 supra. Rescission is permitted generally where "manifest injustice" can
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D. Effect of Rescission
When a defendant does prevail in achieving rescission of a guilty
plea agreement at any stage of the proceedings, he can expect to be
returned to the status quo ante."2 By withdrawal of his guilty plea,
the defendant in effect discharges the prosecution from any further
duty under the repudiated agreement, and the defendant should
envision the probability that he will be brought to trial on the origi-
nal criminal charges pending prior to any of the negotiations which
precipitated the voided agreement. It has been argued that this
outcome is wrong, and that following plea withdrawal a defendant
should not face prosecution on charges more serious than those to
which he pleaded guilty or risk punishment greater than that speci-
fied in the repudiated agreement." 3 The courts have rejected this
argument,"' and justifiably so, since it contravenes basic contrac-
tual principles."
V. IMPLICATIONS OF THE GUILTY PLEA IN A CONTRACTUAL SETTING
The appellant in Santobello relied to his detriment upon a prom-
ise made by one prosecutor and ignored by a second prosecutor who
be shown, such as under the following circumstances: defendant was denied the effective
assistance of counsel; the plea was not entered or ratified by the defendant or his authorized
agent; the plea was entered involuntarily or without the defendant's knowledge of the nature
of the charge(s) or of the sentence which could be imposed against him; or the defendant did
not receive the charge or sentence concessions promised to him by the prosecutor or the court.
See, e.g., Rule 26.1(c), ARK. R. CRiM. P.
112. See note 106 supra.
113. See Williamson, The Constitutionality of Reindicting Successful Plea-Bargain Ap-
pellants on the Original Higher Charges, 62 CAL. L. REv. 258 (1974). This author argues that
prosecutorial vindictiveness should be presumed from this practice. Id. at 259, 291. While
sentences may not be imposed as a result of judicial vindictiveness (North Carolina v. Pearce,
395 U.S. 711 (1969)) or as a result of prosecutorial vindictiveness (Chaffin v. Stynchcombe,
412 U.S. 17, 27 n.13 (1973)), returning the defendant to the status quo ante following an
appeal in which a guilty plea is overturned does not constitute vindictiveness per se. A rule
of reason was established by the Supreme Court, based upon three criteria: (1) knowledge of
the prior sentence; (2) determination of the second sentence by the same judicial authority
whose handling of the prior trial was sufficiently unacceptable to require reversal; and (3)
institutional interest in limiting meritless appeals. Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 26-
27 (1973).
114. Id.
115. That breach of one party discharges the other party from remaining obligations
under the contract. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Williams v. McMann, 436 F.2d 103 (2d
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 914 (1971).
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succeeded the first."' Counsel pointed to the doctrine of promissory
estoppel and prevailed," 7 but quite obviously a more explicit agree-
ment would have buttressed the appellant's argument. In the five
years since Santobello, it has become fashionable for both prosecu-
tors and defense counsel to devise detailed agreements prior to the
tender of guilty pleas by defendants. More important and more
alarming, perhaps, has been the trend for lawyers and judges to
construct elaborate guilty plea agreement forms."8 The "battle of
the forms" has been a thorn in the side of attorneys involved in
contract litigation for years, and this warfare seems to be erupting
now in a new theatre-that of the disposition of criminal charges by
negotiation and guilty plea without trial.
One paramount question emerges for consideration: Will a
written guilty plea agreement provide a defendant with any greater
security than a verbal understanding? The parties to any written
agreement are always free to show by oral testimony that the writing
was not a final expression of their agreement with respect to the
terms contained therein. The parties remain free to modify the writ-
ten contract orally even after it has been completed, since as long
as the modification is not integrated into the agreement it is outside
of the ban perpetuated by the parol evidence rule. Moreover, when
the parties (and possibly when the prosecutor and defense counsel
alone) have enjoyed a continuous relationship, course of dealing,"9
course of performance,2 0 plus trade usage and custom' may be
relevant to show a waiver or a modification of any terms in the
agreement which can be shown to be inconsistent to these factors.
Over the past fifteen years, courts have begun to view consumer
sales contracts as being inherently, different from traditional con-
tracts, and especially different from contracts between merchants. 22
116. 404 U.S. 257, 259 (1971).
117. Id. at 259 and 262.
118. More than one-third of the judicial units visited during the Georgetown Project have
implemented one or more plea agreement forms. At least half of these are as complex as those
forms appended to the statutes in Arizona, Minnesota, and Washington. See note 30 supra.
119. See, e.g., 12A N.J. STATS., § 1-205(a), (3) where this criterion is incorporated within
the Retail Installment Sales Act. Analogy is made to the plea agreement.
120. Id. § 2-208(3).
121. See note 119 supra.
122. This trend began in the companion cases of Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture
Co. and Thorne v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965). The con-
sumer as a buyer intends to use goods for personal or household purposes, and may lack
knowledge and skill in commercial transactions. See, inter alia, Skilton and Helstad,
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Courts have reconsidered in light of the consumer the wisdom of
such presumptions as caveat emptor, equality of bargaining power,
freedom of choice, and freedom of contract.13 The consumer-
plaintiff has been marginally successful by raising two crucially
important defenses to the enforcement of certain contracts, particu-
larly installment sales agreements purporting to require payment
for non-conforming goods. 2' These defenses are fraud and uncon-
scionability. Is the defendant who has been charged with commit-
ting a crime and who is confronted with the "choice" of a guilty plea
or a trial any less a consumer? The doctrine of commercial uncon-
scionability has been applied to contracts other than for the sale of
goods in commerce,'2 and there appears to be no good reason why
this important doctrine cannot be applied to the disposition of crim-
inal charges by means of the negotiated guilty plea agreement.
Every guilty plea agreement should be examined to detect the pres-
ence of fraud or unconscionability.
A. The Implication of Fraud
Fraud may become a material issue surrounding the creation or
fulfillment of any agreement. It may take the form of fraud on the
inducement, constructive fraud or collateral fraud, each of which
deserves separate mention.
1. Fraud on the Inducement
The singularly most widespread fraud pertaining to guilty plea
agreements may be fraud on the inducement. It may take the form
Protection of the Installment Buyer of Goods Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 65 MICH.
L. REV. 1465 (1967).
123. See, e.g., Central Budget Corp. v. Sanchez, 53 Misc.2d 620, 279 N.Y.S.2d 391 (Civ.
Ct. 1967); Unico v. Owen, 50 N.J. 101, 232 A.2d 405 (1967); In re Elkins-Dell Mfg. Co., 253
F. Supp. 864 (E.D. Pa. 1966); and American Home Improvement, Inc. v. Maclver, 105 N.H.
435, 201 A.2d 886 (1964).
124. See, e.g., Cellini & Wertz, From Roman Law to the UCC, 42 Tut. L. REv. 193
(1967); Comment, Bargaining Power and Unconscionability: A Suggested Approach to UCC
Section 2-302, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 998 (1966); Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The
Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 485 (1967); Note, The Doctrine of Unconsciona-
bility, 19 MAINE L. REV. 81 (1967); and Note, Unconscionable Contracts Under the Uniform
Commercial Code, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 401 (1961).
125. See, e.g., Berkowitz v. Berkowitz, 55 N.J. 564, 264 A.2d 49 (1970) and Schiff v. Schiff,
116 N.J. Super. Ct. 546, 283 A.2d 131 (1970) in which the doctrine of commercial unconsciona-
bility has been bandied about in connection with the matrimonial separation agreement. See
also Wertlake v. Wertlake, 137 N.J. Super. Ct. 476, 349 A.2d 552 (1975).
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of deceit or duress or both. It may emanate from the prosecutor, the
defense counsel, or both, or from other defendants or even the court.
The defendant may be unduly frightened, particularly when he has
been in pre-trial confinement for the first time. This incapacity by
the defendant may be exploited by members of the bar or even of
the judiciary who will misrepresent to the defendant important cri-
teria in an effort to achieve a disposition with a conviction but
without a trial. Misrepresentations are likely to consist of the follow-
ing: the "firmness" of the prosecutor's plea "offer" (a representation
that it will be "withdrawn" unless the defendant takes "advantage"
of it within a short time period); the quantity of the evidence tend-
ing to inculpate the defendant (a representation that fingerprints,
ballistics tests, and other real evidence document guilt conclusively
when they do not); the quality of the evidence (a representation that
witnesses are available, ready, willing, and able to testify to the
defendant's guilt, when they are not); the cost and publicity of a
trial (a representation that the financial burden of a trial would
bankrupt the defendant's family, or that news media coverage of a
trial would stigmatize the defendant or his family, when neither is
likely unless the crime is sensational); the sentencing habit of the
judge (a representation that the defendant will receive "mercy"
after a guilty plea but "justice" after a guilty verdict by trial); and
the imminence of release following a guilty plea (a representation
that jail time will be computed so that the defendant's sentence
following a guilty plea will be equal to the amount of confinement
already served). Some of these representations are totally false,
and others will be partially true. The existence of fraud should not
be ruled out in the absence of a complete and objective evaluation
of each of the above factors.
Fraud on the inducement could be limited, although undoubtedly
not eliminated, by a mandatory "cooling-off" period within which
time following entry into a guilty plea agreement the defendant
could repudiate it. A cancellation period ranging up to seventy two
hours has been adopted by statute in many states during which time
consumers may withdraw from sales contracts. 2 1 A similar period,
if implemented at all, should follow tender of the plea, since the
defendant may not sense the full magnitude of his actions until




following actual performance pursuant to the agreement. This
suggestion would be a compromise between the rule in Georgia per-
mitting plea withdrawal as of right at any time before imposition
of sentence, and the rule elsewhere limiting this privilege to the
court's discretion for good reasons shown.'27
2. Constructive Fraud
Constructive fraud is perpetrated by the commission or the omis-
sion of any legal or equitable duty, trust, or confidence. In the plea
agreement context, it pertains most commonly to the failure of
counsel, and not just to the failure of defense counsel. Constructive
fraud may be witnessed when a prosecutor who knows the case
against a defendant is weak's fails to disclose the weakness to de-
fense counsel. It may be present, also, when defense counsel does
not investigate the legal or trial sufficiency of the prosecution's case
against the defendant; or when apprised of such weakness directly
or indirectly, he fails to communicate this factor to his client. 2
Constructive fraud is apparent blatantly when a defense counsel
"trades-off" one client for the benefit of another or for his own social
127. See GA. CODE ANN. § 27-1404; Hamm v. State, 179 S.E.2d 274 (Ga. 1970) and Burkett
v. State, 205 S.E.2d 496 (Ga. 1974). The American Bar Association recommends that even
presentence plea withdrawal should not be permitted if the prosecution would be substan-
tially prejudiced thereby. ABA Standards, Pleas of Guilty 58 (1968). Most states permit the
court to allow plea withdrawal as a matter of discretion prior to judgment on the plea. See
IOWA CODE ANN. § 771.15. In California, a defendant who was without counsel has an absolute
right to withdraw a plea. People v. Cruz, 526 P.2d 250 (1974). Following imposition of sent-
ence, the more rigid "manifest injustice" standard becomes the test for allowing withdrawal
of a plea in federal courts under Rule 32(d), FED. R. CalM. P. Unreasonable denial of a
defendant's motion for plea withdrawal may constitute an abuse of the court's discretion,
however. See State ex rel. Clancy v. Coiner, 179 S.E.2d 726 (W. Va. 1971); State v. Carillo,
271 A.2d 625 (R.I. 1970); People v. Barr, 304 N.E.2d 476 (Ill. 1973); and People v. Harmon,
220 N.W.2d 210 (Mich. 1974).
128. For instance, weakness may be in the form of a co-defendant's confession that would
reduce the defendant's culpability. A prosecutor's suppression of this evidence violates due
process whether done in good or in bad faith. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). See
also, United States v. Pisacano, 459 F.2d 259 (2d Cir. 1972), where the prosecutor withheld
his knowledge that the government's case was predicated upon perjured testimony.
129. The decision to plead or not to plead guilty should always be that of the client, and
counsel has an obligation to prepare his client for this choice by illuminating all evidence for
and against this course of action. See ABA Standards, The Defense Function.
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benefit,' 30 at least without the written consent' 3' of all clients in-
volved.
3. Collateral Fraud
Sometimes known as extrinsic fraud, collateral fraud occurs
whenever the defendant is prevented from having a trial on the
merits to determine his innocence or guilt to each elements of every
charge pending against him, for any reason whatsoever without his
informed consent. In one sense, this type of fraud may take place
whenever either of the other two types of fraud are perpetrated. It
may be evidenced more directly, however, when defense counsel
makes a revelation to the court or to the prosecutor "admitting" his
client's factual or even legal guilt, which may have a disasterous
effect on the sentence actually to be imposed or on the number and
seriousness of the charges to which the defendant will be allowed to
plead guilty.
A full providency hearing is necessary to determine the presence
or absence of fraud in any manner and this kind of a hearing should
take place before a jury of at least six persons rather than before the
court sitting alone. A providency hearing need not become a surro-
gate trial, since only a synopsis of the evidence need be presented.
However, the prosecutor should be compelled to affirm under oath
the legal and factual bases for each defendant's guilty plea; conse-
quently, not only should the plea be voidable but the prosecutor be
charged criminally in the event it should turn out that the evidence
was not presented in good faith.
B. The Implication of Unconscionability
The term "unconscionability" is not always easy to define or to
apply to a specific contractual situation. This is as it should be,
according to one of the first judges to grant relief from a contractual
obligation based upon this doctrine.' 32 It has been held that the
130. See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSImMrY, EC 5-1; DR 5-101 through 5-107.
131. The written consent of all clients is required to alleviate a conflict of interest under
California Rules of Professional Conduct, Rules 5-101 and 5-102. Undoubtedly, this is the
better practice and should be required in every jurisdiction, particularly when the conflict
involves representation of a client charged with a crime.
132. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (Wright,
C.J.).
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"mores and business practices of the time and place" should deter-
mine unconscionability, and that the test should not be simple or
"mechanically applied."'3 Unconscionability has been recognized
as including the "absence of meaningful choice on the part of one
of the parties together with contract terms which are unreasonably
favorable to the other party.' 3 4 Unconscionability cases turn often
on the amount of bargaining power possessed by the consumer
party,3 5 and in the context of the guilty plea should be decided in
view of the bargaining power possessed by the defendant and his
counsel. 131
A consumer, and even more so a defendant charged with a crime,
may possess sufficient bargaining power to avoid a contract alto-
gether but not to avoid specific terms therein once he has been
deceived into agreeing to the terms thereof generally. This is pre-
cisely the danger of the adhesion contract, to which the doctrine of
unconscionability has been applied successfully by the courts in
several landmark cases. 137 In the guilty plea context, a defendant
133. Id. at 450.
134. Id. at 449-450.
135. Id. The court in Williams reasoned:
Whether a meaningful choice is present in a particular case can only be determined
by consideration of all the circumstances surrounding the transaction. In many cases
the meaningfulness of choice is negated by a gross inequality of bargaining power. The
manner in which the contract was entered is also relevant to this consideration. Did
each party to the contract, considering his obvious education or lack of it, have a
reasonable opportunity to understand the terms of the contract, or were the important
terms hidden in a maze of fine print and minimized by deceptive sales practices?
Ordinarily, one who signs an agreement without full knowledge of its terms might be
held to assume the risk that he has entered a one-sided bargain. But when a party of
little bargaining power, and hence little real choice, signs a commercially unreasonable
contract with little or no knowledge of its terms, it is hardly likely that his consent, or
even an objective manifestation of his consent, was ever given to all the terms. In such
a case the usual rule that the terms of an agreement are not to be questioned should
be abandoned and the court should consider whether the terms of the contract are so
unfair that enforcement should be withheld.
Id.
136. For instance, what, if anything, can the defendant do for the prosecutor? A subjective
test of bargaining power seems appropriate, since bargaining power is a variable that is
unlikely to remain constant across different cases. One defendant may be in a position to
testify against a co-defendant and in so doing to bargain down charges pending against
himself. Another defendant may be willing to return stolen property that is hidden, or lead
authorities to the grave of a victim. Undoubtedly, some defendants have nothing to give in
return for a charge or a sentence concession.
137. See, e.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 386-404, 161 A.2d 69,
85-95 (1960); Wilson, Freedom of Contracts and Adhesion Contracts, 14 INT'L & COMP. L.Q.
172 (1965).
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may become confronted by a variety of adhesive provisions. Fore-
most among these may be his purported "waiver" of his right to
appeal the sentence'3 or to appeal error in the proceedings, 3 9 or to
challenge the court's jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
offenses in question.4 0 In addition, some defendants are coaxed into
reciting verbally on the record or in writing that no promises have
been made to induce them into the guilty plea, when this is not true
and both counsel plus the court are aware of the falsehood.' Never-
theless, the clause must be recited to exculpate the administrators
of justice.
VI. CONCLUSION
Since most criminal charges that are filed against most defen-
dants reach a negotiated disposition without trial in nearly every
judicial unit throughout the United States, attention has become
focused upon the processes of guilty plea negotiation, ratification,
and rescission. In most jurisdictions, the negotiations that lead up
to the guilty plea are undertaken casually between defense counsel
and prosecutors, with both substantive and procedural norms being
dictated more by local custom and the personal experiences of the
lawyers than by concrete design or law. Although the negotiation
process might benefit from greater precision and uniformity, the
serious problems that have become associated with guilty pleas tend
to arise at the time of judicial ratification ofthe plea, rather than
138. It has been held that a judge who accepts a guilty plea need not inform a defendant
that by pleading guilty the latter waives his right to appeal errors other than jurisdictional
errors. Determond v. State, 313 A.2d 709 (Md. 1974).
139. See, e.g., Item 23, Appendix A to Rule 15, MiN. R. CraM. P., which provides: "My
attorney has told me and I understand that if my plea of guilty is accepted by the judge I
have the right to appeal, but that any appeal or other court action I may take claiming error
in the proceedings probably would be useless and a waste of my time and the court's." A
guilty plea usually represents a "break in the chain of events" sufficient to prevent appeal of
procedural errors. Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 263 (1973). But some courts have
recommended that a defendant be permitted to plead conditionally and thereby preserve
certain specified rights (such as to challenge an illegal search and seizure) for appeal. See,
e.g., United States v. Clark, 459 F.2d 977 (8th Cir. 1972). See also Cogan, Guilty Pleas: Weak
Links in the 'Broken Chain,' 10 CRiM. L. BuLL. 149 (1974).
140. A guilty plea does not ordinarily waive jurisdictional errors. See, e.g., United States
v. Doyle, 348 F.2d 715, 718-19 (2d Cir. 1965).
141. This was the situation in United States v. Tweedy, 419 F.2d 192, 193 (9th Cir. 1969).





Very few guilty plea "agreements" are specifically written prior
to the moment when the defendant formally enters his plea person-
ally by oral communication before a judge in open court. Undoubt-
edly, many of the troubles that begin with judicial ratification and
continue thereafter have been precipitated by misunderstandings or
by outright misrepresentation of the "agreements" reached through
earlier negotiations. A judge can only ratify an agreement that is
presented to him in unambiguous form, and to the extent that he
is mislead the court may give juristic effect to an "agreement" that
does not exist. At sentencing or shortly thereafter, a defendant who
is dissatisfied with the type or of the severity of the sentence is likely
to disavow his guilty plea and to argue either the failure of its
underlying consideration, his ignorance of its terms at time of plead-
ing, or both. If a sufficient quantum of evidence can be mustered
to support the defendant's post-plea contentions, he may be permit-
ted to withdraw the plea. Thereafter whatever underlying agree-
ment might exist becomes rescinded. The quantum of evidence re-
quired for withdrawal and rescission varies across jurisdictions and
can be even more nebulous than many guilty plea "agreements."
Clearly, guilty pleas that are purported to be based upon an un-
derlying negotiated agreement pose a substantial danger to the
administration of justice. Our society would benefit if the precise
terms underlying consideration of each guilty plea were recited with
clarity as a matter of public record. The federal courts and at least
half of the state courts have attempted to do this by requiring defen-
dants or their counsel to recite the basic terms by such agreements
in front of the prosecutor and in open court where a verbatim tran-
script of this testimony is made. However, the average defendant
does not possess the capacity to recite from memory his accurate
recollection of the terms underlying the guilty plea that he plans to
enter. For this reason, courts should consider requiring guilty plea
agreements to be written at the time when they were executed,
which may be months in advance of the defendant's actual tender
of the plea and which consequently may be months in advance of
sentencing on the resulting conviction.
Once written, the terms of a guilty plea agreement may be recited
verbally by a defendant in open court at time of pleading since the
defendant can use the instrument that he previously executed to
refresh his memory. A written plea agreement should contain a
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detailed statement by the defendant as to the factual accuracy of
the plea and his understanding of the elements of each charge, in
his own words if possible. In this way, it should be difficult for a
defendant to recant his admissions as to the accuracy of the charge
and his understanding of the charge without commiting perjury.
The defendant should be required to affirm the accuracy of the
agreement under oath, and the agreement that contains a jurat
should be evidence of his testimony. A written plea agreement
should contain a detailed statement by the prosecutor as to any
reductions in the number or the severity of the charges and as to the
proposed sentence recommendation. An explicit statement regard-
ing the likelihood that such a sentence recommendation will be ac-
cepted in substance by the court should be included. An assortment
of additional items may be included in a written guilty plea agree-
ment, including but not limited to a list of the constitutional rights
that the defendant will waive by pleading guilty and his acknowl-
edgement of his understanding of the same. Both defense counsel
and the prosecutor should be required to execute a jurat on the
written guilty plea agreement form, after having recited thereon
their understanding of the accuracy and completeness of the instru-
ment, the terms of the agreement, and the underlying consideration
for the agreement.
Whether a defendant should be allowed to revoke a guilty plea
agreement prior to appearing in court to actually tender the plea is
a matter of policy that can be expected to vary among the different
judicial units, but should be a matter of certainty within any given
jurisdiction. It is also a matter which the defendant should under-
stand and acknowledge on the face of the instrument. If a guilty plea
agreement is to remain revocable until defendant's tender of the
plea, revocation should be accomplished in a manner similar to
revocation of a testamentary instrument-by destruction of the in-
strument. At a minimum, revocation should be undertaken by com-
munication of this intent to all parties involved, preferably in writ-
ing. Unless the instrument's terms are expressly of finite duration,
the defendant may be in a position to compel its enforcement. In
this respect, a guilty plea agreement may contain pitfalls similar to
those of an executory contract for the sale of land-the defendant
may disavow it today and insist that it be honored tomorrow. Fi-
nally, if the instrument is to be irrevocable and it passes constitu-
tional muster, issues arise as to how to deal with the defendant who
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executes an irrevocable guilty plea agreement duly and properly,
but who refuses subsequently to appear in court to tender the asso-
ciated plea. Surely, his counsel cannot plead him guilty without his
consent. May the prosecutor "confess" criminal judgment against
the defendant through the instrument? May the court appoint an-
other attorney to do so? These are examples of the many derivative
questions that may emerge as written guilty plea agreements be-
come customary.
To be sure, there are additional hazards that will emerge as guilty
plea agreements cease to be sub rosa and start to become memorial-
ized explicitly for public scrutiny. As in commerce, domestic rela-
tions, and the exchange of property, however, once recognized and
reduced to writing, the guilty plea agreement can be regulated
objectively on a basis that will assure greater fairness to individual
defendants and to the community.
